FGT5012 Locate UE

Description: An adversary may obtain the UE location using radio access or core network.

Adversary may employ various means to obtain UE location (coarse, fine) using radio access or core network.

Labelling:

* Sub-technique(s): FGT5012.001, FGT5012.002, FGT5012.003, FGT5012.004, FGT5012.005, FGT5012.006
* Applicable Tactics: Discovery, Collection

Metadata:

* Architecture segment: RAN, Control-plane
* Platforms: 5G Network
* Access type required:
* Data Sources:
* Theoretical/Proof of concept/Observed: Observed

Procedure Examples:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Description** |
| Use radio access to locate UE | Adversary may use the radio access network to determine that a particular UE is in the area, or where exactly the UE is located |
| Use core network signaling to locate UE | Adversary may use the core network signaling to trigger the procedure of locating a particular UE via RAN |

Mitigations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **ID** | **Use** |
| If known | Short description of potential mitigations. |
|  |  |

Pre-Conditions

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Description** |
| If known | Short description of conditions that must be present for technique to be used. |
|  |  |

Critical Assets

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| --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Description** |
| If known | Short description of the assets that adversary wants to target or that are at risk such as data (system/user, access token, crypto key etc.), capability, service. |
| UE location | UE/User geographical location, coarse or fine-grained |

Detection

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **ID** | **Detects** |
| If known | Short description of possible detection techniques such as logs or sensors. |
|  |  |

Post-Conditions

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Name** | **Description** |
| If known | Short description of potential capabilities achieved by the technique (e.g. escape from container gives control of the host) |
|  |  |

References:

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| --- | --- |
| **Name** | **URL** |
| European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA): “ENISA Threat Landscape for 5G Networks” Report, December 2020. | https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-threat-landscape-report-for-5g-networks |
| S.P. Rao, S. Holtmanns, T. Aura: “Threat modeling framework for mobile communication systems”, May 2020 | https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.05110v1 |